Merge pull request 'Retry the Harbor manifest copy instead of a probe for it' (#3) from fix-harbor-tag-retry into main

Reviewed-on: #3

.gitea/workflows/build.yml

@@ -66,14 +66,23 @@ jobs:
           cache-from: type=registry,ref=${{ env.IMAGE }}:buildcache
           cache-to: type=registry,ref=${{ env.IMAGE }}:buildcache,mode=max
 
+      # The primary tag is already pushed and deployable by the time this runs:
+      # the image policy selects `main-<timestamp>`, so a failure here costs the
+      # SHA audit tag, not the rollout.
       - name: Wait for Harbor policy, then add SHA tag
+        shell: bash
         env:
           PRIMARY: ${{ steps.tags.outputs.primary }}
           QUALIFIED: ${{ steps.tags.outputs.qualified }}
         run: |
+          # Harbor's vulnerability policy blocks manifest reads while Trivy's scan
+          # is still Running, and `imagetools create` copies the manifest. Retry
+          # that copy itself rather than an `inspect` probe: a probe that passes is
+          # no guarantee the copy will, and under the default `bash -e` the first
+          # blocked copy aborted the step before its retries could run.
           for attempt in $(seq 1 60); do
-            if docker buildx imagetools inspect "$PRIMARY" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            if docker buildx imagetools create --tag "$QUALIFIED" "$PRIMARY"; then
-              docker buildx imagetools create --tag "$QUALIFIED" "$PRIMARY"
+              echo "tagged $QUALIFIED on attempt $attempt"
               exit 0
             fi
             echo "waiting for Harbor scan/pull policy ($attempt/60)"

AGENTS.md

@@ -35,6 +35,12 @@ The image does not set `BTCDATA_URL`; deployments must provide it. `BUILD_SHA` i
 runner, then publishes immutable linux/amd64 images to
 `harbor.pmagnus.cloud/btcprice/btcprice`. It embeds the short Git SHA as `APP_VERSION`.
 
+The build pushes two tags: `main-<timestamp>`, then a companion `main-<timestamp>-<sha>` for
+audit. Harbor's vulnerability policy blocks manifest reads while Trivy is still scanning, so
+the companion tag is retried until the scan clears. Only the first tag matters for deployment —
+the Flux image policy matches `^main-<14 digits>$` — so a failure in that last step costs the
+audit tag and nothing else.
+
 Flux image automation updates the manifests in the separate `magnus/deploy` repository and Flux
 reconciles k3s. CI has no Kubernetes credentials. Production runs two replicas—one on hostinger and
 one on citadel—and is served at https://btcprice.k8s.pmagnus.cloud through ingress-nginx and

CLAUDE.md

@@ -35,6 +35,12 @@ The image does not set `BTCDATA_URL`; deployments must provide it. `BUILD_SHA` i
 runner, then publishes immutable linux/amd64 images to
 `harbor.pmagnus.cloud/btcprice/btcprice`. It embeds the short Git SHA as `APP_VERSION`.
 
+The build pushes two tags: `main-<timestamp>`, then a companion `main-<timestamp>-<sha>` for
+audit. Harbor's vulnerability policy blocks manifest reads while Trivy is still scanning, so
+the companion tag is retried until the scan clears. Only the first tag matters for deployment —
+the Flux image policy matches `^main-<14 digits>$` — so a failure in that last step costs the
+audit tag and nothing else.
+
 Flux image automation updates the manifests in the separate `magnus/deploy` repository and Flux
 reconciles k3s. CI has no Kubernetes credentials. Production runs two replicas—one on hostinger and
 one on citadel—and is served at https://btcprice.k8s.pmagnus.cloud through ingress-nginx and